Landlord and Tenant -- Landlord\u27s Liability for Negligence of Independent Contractor by Schneider, Reuben M.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 15 Number 4 Article 6 
7-1-1961 
Landlord and Tenant -- Landlord's Liability for Negligence of 
Independent Contractor 
Reuben M. Schneider 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Reuben M. Schneider, Landlord and Tenant -- Landlord's Liability for Negligence of Independent 
Contractor, 15 U. Miami L. Rev. 412 (1961) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol15/iss4/6 
This Case Noted is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
412 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
There would appear to be an apparent conflict between the result
reached in the instant case and the Florida Supreme Court case of
McIntyre v. McIntyre .2 In that case, the wife left Florida for more than
six months, returning for a few days to file for divorce. She alleged that
she was a bona fide resident of Florida. The Florida Supreme Court held
that the mere removal of the wife to another state, without more, is
insufficient to rebut the presumption that the wife's domicile was that
of the husband.2 9 Therefore, the wife acquired the necessary residence
time by virtue of the common law fiction that the domicile of the husband
is that of the wife.
After careful review of the facts presented in the Brown case, it
appears that the jurisdictional requirements should have been sustained
by the District Court of Appeal, when viewed in the light of the McIntyre
decision. In both cases the court held that the wife acquired the domicile
of her husband, but, according to McIntyre this was sufficient to confer
residence upon the wife.30 It is submitted that the court improperly incor-
porated into the statute a new jurisdictional requirement for divorce. A
complainant wife, whose husband has acquired a domicile in the state,
must now physically reside six months in the state before the filing of her
complaint. Although this would appear to be the better view, the change
made by the court properly lay with the state legislature.
MARVIN S. MALTZMAN
LANDLORD AND TENANT -LANDLORD'S LIABILITY
FOR NEGLIGENCE OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
The lessors voluntarily agreed to repair the roof of certain leased
premises. They employed an independent contractor to perform the work.
While the repairs were being made, rain came through the roof and
damaged plaintiff's furniture and furnishings. The plaintiff sued the
lessors for failure to exercise proper control over the contractor. The trial
court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. On appeal, held, reversed:
a lessor who gratuitously assumes to make repairs on leased premises may
not absolve himself from liability by employing an independent contractor.
Easton v. Weir, 125 So.2d 115 (Fla. App. 1961).





At common law, a landlord was under no duty to repair the leased
premises.' However, if he assumed such a duty either by agreement 2 or
voluntarily,3 and he 4 or one of his servants! made the repairs in a
negligent manner, the landlord was responsible for resulting personal
injury' or property damage.7
The courts are in conflict as to the responsibility of the landlord
when an independent contractor is employed to perform the repairs. Some
courts adopt the view that the hiring of an independent contractor will
excuse the landlord's liability,8 whereas the modern view holds the landlord
answerable for the resultant damage." However, all courts agree that
when any of the following factors are present, the landlord will be liable:
(1) employment of an incompetent contractor to do the work; 10 (2) taking
any part in the direction of the repairs;" (3) using any portion of the
repaired premises for his own purposes; 12 or (4) the work is inherently
dangerous. 13 The tenant, however, may sue the contractor for his negligence, 14
or the landlord, after payment, may obtain indemnification from the
contractor-tortfeasor.15
Most judicial authority allows recovery against the landlord when
as a result of the independent contractor's repairs, the tenant 16 or someone
1. Beard v. General Real Estate Corp., 229 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1956); Felshin
v. Sir, 149 Fla. 218, 5 So.2d 600 (1942); Masser v. London Operating Co., 106
Fla. 474, 145 So. 72 (1932).
2. Chipman v. National Say. Bank, 128 Conn. 493, 23 A.2d 922 (1942);
Propper v. Kesner, 104 So.2d I (Fla. 1958); Kimmons v. Crawford, 92 Fla. 652,
109 So. 585 (1926); Weldon v. Lehmann, 226 Miss. 600, 84 So.2d 796 (1956).
3. Bailey v. Zlotnick, 80 U.S. App. D.C. 117, 149 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1945);
Bowater v. Tassey, 81 Cal. App. 2d 651, 184 P.2d 931 (1947); Walker & Dunlop, Inc.
v. Gladden, 47 A.2d 510 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1946); Case v. Sioux City, 246
Iowa 654, 69 NAV.2d 27 (1955).
4. Chipman v. National Say. Bank, 128 Conn. 493, 23 A.2d 922 (1942);
Verplanck v. Morgan, 90 N.E.2d 872 (Ohio Dist. Ct. App. 1950); Black v. Partridge,
252 P.2d 760 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
5. Mumby v. Bowden, 25 Fla. 454, 6 So. 453 (1889); Southern Apartments,
Inc. v. Emmett, 269 Ala. 584, 114 So.2d 453 (1959); Weldon v. Lehmann, 226 Miss.
600, 84 So.2d 796 (1956).
6. Bailey v. Zlotnick, 80 U.S. App. D.C. 117, 149 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1945);
Kimmons v. Crawford, 92 Fla. 652, 109 So. 585 (1926).
7. Mumby v. Bowden, 25 Fla. 454, 6 So. 453 (1889).
8. Silveus v. Grossman, 307 Pa. 272, 161 At]. 362 (1932).
9. Sutton v. Texas Co., 90 F. Supp. 7 (E.D.N.C.), aff'd, 183 F.2d 383
(4th Cir. 1950); Bailey v. Zlotnick, 80 U.S. App. D.C. 117, 149 F.2d 505 (D.C.
Cir. 1945); Weldon v. Lehmann, 226 Miss. 600, 84 So.2d 796 (1956); Easton
v. Weir, 125 So.2d 115 (Fla. App. 1961).
10. Ozan Lumber Co. v. McNeely, 214 Ark. 657, 217 S.W.2d 341 (1949);
Lawrence v. Shipman, 39 Conn. 586, 590 (1873) (dictum).
11. Lawrence v. Shipman, note 10 supra; Mumby v. Bowden, 25 Fla. 454, 6 So. 453
(1889); Meany v. Abbott, 6 Phila. Rep. 256 (Pa. Dist. Ct., Phila. County, 1867).
12. See Mumby v. Bowden, supra note 11.
13. Wertheimer v. Saunders, 95 Wis. 573, 70 N.W. 824 (1897).
14. St. Johns & H.R. v. Shalley, 33 Fla. 397, 14 So. 891 (1894).
15. It is a fundamental principle of tort law that the tortfeasor is liable for his
torts, and if another person has paid for the resultant damages, he is entitled to
indemnification. See PROSSER, TORTS § 46 (2d ed. 1955).
16. Bailey v. Zlotnick, 80 U.S. App. D.C. 117, 149 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
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rightfully on the premises" suffers personal injury. Prior to the instant
case, only one jurisdiction had decided that the landlord would be
compelled to answer for damage to the tenant's property, its ratio decidendi
being that of the personal injury cases. 18 This rationalization has been
adopted by the Restatement of Torts.'
In the 1889 Florida case of Mumby v. Bowden,'20 the lessors leased
one-half of their building to the plaintiffs, occupying the other side for
their own business. The lessors had covenanted to keep the premises
in good repair. Upon the lessees' request, the lessors hired a certain
company to repair the roof. The lessors went upon the roof with the
workers who performed the repairs in a negligent manner. Rain came
through the roof, damaging the lessees' goods. The lessors admitted the
damage, but contended that they had employed an independent contractor
to do the work, and that the independent contractor insulated them from
liability. The Florida Supreme Court recognized the general rule that
when one employs a contractor to do a job, and the work is done negligently
so as to cause injury or damage to a third person, the employer is not
responsible for the damage. Nevertheless, the court was of the view that
the rule was not applicable for the following reasons: (1) there was no
occasion for surrender of the premises, (2) there was no contract taking
the control of the roof from the lessors, (3) there was even some
indication that the defendants exercised control over the workers, and
(4) the work was necessary to prevent leakage into that portion of the
store used by the lessors. The court held that in legal contemplation the
laborers were the lessors' servants for that particular job, and therefore the
lessors were liable under the theory of respondeat superior. Whether or
not the court would have absolved the lessors from liability for the
negligence of the independent contractor had none of the other elements
been present was not decided in the Mumby case, but rather the statement
of this general rule when applied to the facts was a mere dictum.
2 '
It is difficult for this writer to understand the reasoning of the court
in the Easton case. When a landlord has given up control of the premises,
and does not use any part of the building for his own purposes, there
is no logical reason for holding the landlord liable. Unless the court
17. Donahoo v. Kress House Moving Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 237, 153 P.2d 349 (1944).
18. Weldon v. Lehmann, 226 Miss. 600, 84 So.2d 796 (1956).
19. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 426 (1934).
20. 25 Fla. 454, 6 So. 453 (1889).
21. In City of Mount Dora v. Voorhees, 115 So.2d 586, 589 (Fla. App. 1959),
the District Court of Appeal recognized the rule that "one who engages an independent
contractor to perform a job for him, without reserving control and direction of the work,
will not become liable for the negligence of the independent contractor." The court
cited the Mumby case as authority, characterizing the statement as the holding of the
Mumby case. It is the opinion of this writer that since the court in the Voorhees case
recognized the general rule, and that the facts of the Easton case bring it within the




adopted the view that repairing of a roof is an inherently dangerous task,
the court's holding that the lessor "was under a duty to see that no
injury would be sustained by the tenant in the making of the repairs"
cannot be upheld. The court has made the landlord an absolute insurer for
everything done by the contractor within the scope of his employment. It is
submitted that if the court meant to do this, it should have stated what
it was doing in unequivocal terms, rather than attempting to justify a
result by citing Florida cases which do not support the view adopted by
the court.
REUBEN M. SCHNEIDER
FEDERAL REMOVAL - JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT
The plaintiff, a longshoreman and citizen of Florida, filed suit in
a Florida circuit court to recover damages allegedly due to the negligence
of the defendant, or to the unseaworthiness of the defendant's vessel.
The complaint alleged that the defendant was a Connecticut corporation
with an office and principal place of business' in Florida, and demanded
damages in excess of 5,000 dollars. 2 Defendant removed the action to
a federal district court alleging the requisite diversity and jurisdictional
amount in the petition for removal. The plaintiff moved to remand,
claiming the ad damnum clause of the complaint did not meet the federal
jurisdictional requirement, but the motion was denied. A jury trial
resulted in a verdict for the defendant. On appeal, held, reversed and
remanded: a complaint demanding damages in excess of 5,000 dollars
is not removable from a state court to a federal court in the absence
of affirmative proof that the damages claimed exceed 10,000 dollars.
Gaitor v. Peninsular & Occidental S.S. Co., 287 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1961).
A civil action brought in a state court may generally be removed by
the defendant to a federal district court, provided the federal court could
have had jurisdiction originally.a The right to remove is one granted by
1. "For the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title, a corporation
shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the
State where it has its principal place of business." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1958). The
issue of diversity of citizenship was not raised prior to trial. The issue was raised
on appeal but was not ruled upon as other grounds were present to reverse and remand
the action.
2. The Circuit Court for Dade County, Florida has jurisdiction of all actions at
law provided the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $5,000. FLA. CONST., art. 5,
§ 6(3); FLA. STAT. § 33.02 (1959). See note 23 infra.
3. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951); Gold-Washing & Water
Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 (1877); Delpit v. United States Shipping Board Emergency
Fleet Corp., 19 F.2d 60 (9th Cir. 1927); City of Corbin v. Varden, 18 F. Supp. 531
(E.D. Ky. 1937); Belcher v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 809 (W.D. Tex. 1933).
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